![]() Accordingly, although the use of LEU in submarines is possible, nuclear weapon states fear that Brazil may choose uranium enriched to more than 20% (Kassenova 2014).Īccording to article 14 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), nuclear fuel could be exempt from safeguards. In turn, Russia uses uranium enriched to more than 20% and France is believed to use low-enriched uranium (LEU). ![]() The US and the United Kingdom use highly enriched uranium (HEU), that is, uranium enriched to more than 90%, in their submarines. In particular, international suspicions have arisen due to the type of fuel Brazil might use in its nuclear submarine. Moreover, the project generated questions and concerns regarding the Non-Proliferation Regime and the potential for the production of weapons-grade material. Thus, Brazil would become the first non-nuclear state to develop a nuclear-propelled submarine. Currently only the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and India dominate such technology. This is a crucial theme, as it has generated concern internationally (see Diehl and Fujii 2008 Taylor 2009) and it has mobilised an important amount of resources nationally. We will unpack both arguments in the second and third sections below. In other words, we claim that the notions of ‘strategic area’, ‘general deterrence’, and ‘conventional deterrence’ can help us analyse the fundamental aspects involved in the framing of the South Atlantic as a security concern, justifying the nuclear-propelled submarine project. On the other hand, we contend that the need for a nuclear-propelled submarine is framed through the mobilisation of a specific notion of deterrence. On the one hand, we propose that the project of building a nuclear-propelled submarine has become possible partly because of the mobilisation of a set of arguments for the construction of the South Atlantic as a strategic area, framed in terms of security and development. We discuss the other two elsewhere (Herz, Dawood and Lage, forthcoming). In this text, we focus on the third set of arguments. There are three main sets of arguments put forward by the Brazilian ruling elites for the nuclear-propelled submarine project: first, the concern with the autonomy of the country’s foreign policy and even the prospects of becoming a major power and joining the UN Security Council second, the association between development and control of nuclear technology (Herz, Dawood and Lage, forthcoming) and finally, the arguments for the construction and consolidation of the South Atlantic as a strategic area. In addition to drawing closer to Moscow, Tehran has sought improved relations with China, which brokered an agreement last month to restore diplomatic ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia.In this article, we analyse one aspect of Brazilian nuclear policy during the tenure of the Workers Party (2003–2016): the development of a nuclear-propelled submarine. The tensions have worsened as Iran has supplied attack drones to Russian forces in Ukraine and as Israel and Iran have escalated their yearslong shadow war in the Middle East. The Biden administration’s efforts to restore the agreement hit a wall last year. U.S.-Iranian tensions have soared since then-President Donald Trump withdrew from a 2015 agreement with world powers that provided sanctions relief in return for Iran curbing its nuclear activities and placing them under enhanced surveillance. They were famously employed during the opening hours of the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and in response to a Syrian chemical weapons attack in 2018. Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from ships or submarines can hit targets up to 2,500 kilometers (1,500 miles away). contractor and wounded seven other Americans in that country’s northeast. launched airstrikes against Iran-backed forces in Syria after a rocket attack killed a U.S.
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